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1. Introduction
“The story of the credit rating agencies is a story of colossal failure.”
Henry Waxman (D-CA), chairman of the House Oversight and Government
Reform Committee between 2007 and 2009.
Massive downgrading and defaults during the 2008/2009 financial crisis have led
politicians, regulators, and the popular press to conclude that the rating agencies’ business-
model is fundamentally flawed. Since the issuer pays the rating agency to provide a rating,
so the popular argument goes, rating agencies can capture some or all of the benefit of
providing high ratings, implying “huge conflicts of interest” (Krugman, 2010) between
rating agencies and the investors.
Recent academic studies provide a more nuanced perspective. For example, Stanton
and Wallace (2010) provide evidence that incentives for rating inflation were particularly
strong in the commercial mortgage-backed securities (MBS) market because of regula-
tory changes that reduced risk-based capital weights for Aaa-rated commercial MBSs
compared with lower rated whole loans in the years leading up to the 2008/2009 crisis.
This suggests that the increase in the regulatory advantage of the Aaa rating for these
securities played an important role in the massive rating downgrades and high default
rates observed during and following the crisis. For another example, although rating stan-
dards in the residential MBS market declined in the years leading up to the 2008/2009
crisis (Ashcraft, Goldsmith-Pinkham, and Vickery, 2010), they stayed conservative for
corporate bonds.1 These facts are difficult to explain based purely on conflicts of interest
inherent in the issuer-pays model. We argue that theories of rating standards should
not merely explain rating agencies’ performance or failure in one specific episode but
rather shed light on economic conditions that lead to better or worse outcomes when
information acquisition is delegated to rating agencies.
To this end, this paper develops a theory that addresses determinants of cross-
sectional and time-series variation in rating standards within a rational-expectations
framework. Our analysis focuses on the interaction between the existing issuer-pays
model of major rating agencies, and the regulatory use of ratings, such as the use of
credit ratings to determine bank capital requirements. Rational expectations of investors
imply that investors are not fooled in equilibrium by “obvious” conflicts of interest in-
herent in the business model of rating agencies.2 Incorporating the regulatory use of
ratings into the analysis is appealing because there is extensive empirical evidence that
regulatory implications of ratings are a first-order concern for marginal investors; that
is, ratings affect market prices through the channel of regulation, independent of the
information they provide about the riskiness of securities (Kisgen and Strahan, 2010;
1The sample of Ashcraft, Goldsmith-Pinkham, and Vickery (2010) covers the period between 2001
and 2007. Griffin and Tang (2012) report a sudden increase in rating standards as of mid-2007.
2In line with our rational expectations hypothesis, He, Qian, and Strahan (2012) and Kronlund (2011)
provide evidence that investors required larger yields for bond issues that were subject to a greater risk
of rating inflation.
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Ashcraft, Goldsmith-Pinkham, Hull, and Vickery, 2011).3 Our contribution is to incor-
porate the rating agency’s ability to sell favorable regulatory treatment explicitly in a
theoretical framework and to analyze its feedback effect on rating standards. Our results
contrast with the popular notion that catering (to issuers) hurts investors, since they
take ratings at face value and do not anticipate rating agencies’ strategic incentives.4 In
our framework, the rating agency effectively caters to institutional investors’ demands
for regulatory relief, and investors are not fooled by inflated ratings.
Our analysis is positive in the sense that we take existing regulatory rules that favor
highly rated securities as given, and analyze their impact on rating standards across asset
classes with differential characteristics and over time. Although we do not attempt to an-
swer a broader question of optimal regulation design in this paper, our model contributes
toward a better understanding of the subtle effects rating-contingent regulation can have
on rating standards.5 Moreover, since regulation is an observable economic variable, our
theory produces testable implications. In particular, it allows us to analyze the reper-
cussions on credit rating standards implied by the Dodd-Frank Act, which mandates the
elimination of rating-contingent regulation.
Our model reveals how the mere existence of a regulatory advantage for highly rated
securities implies that small changes in characteristics such as the quality distribution of
issuers, the complexity of securities, and issuers’ outside options may induce large shifts in
rating standards. This vulnerability is generated by an endogenous threshold level of the
regulatory advantage beyond which the rating agency finds it profitable to stop acquir-
ing any information and merely facilitates regulatory arbitrage through rating inflation.
Below this threshold level, the rating agency acquires costly, private information and re-
veals this information truthfully to the public. In this case, an increase in the regulatory
advantage of highly rated securities may actually increase rating informativeness. Since
different asset classes will have different threshold levels for rating inflation, the effect
3In the United States, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) recognizes ten rating agencies,
the so-called nationally recognized statistical rating organizations (NRSROs). White (2010) provides
an excellent summary of the regulatory use of ratings. Kisgen and Strahan (2010) use the regulatory
accreditation of Dominion Bond Rating Services as a natural experiment to identify the impact of
regulation. Bongaerts, Cremers, and Goetzmann (2012) also document the first-order importance of
rating-contingent regulation by exploiting the regulatory treatment of securities rated by multiple rating
agencies.
4Kraft (2011) analyzes whether rating agencies cater to borrowers with rating-based loan coupon
rates. She finds mixed evidence for this notion of catering.
5Given that regulation is the culprit, one might ask why the regulation is structured the way it is.
An explanation that follows from our model is that the existing regulation worked pretty well for many
years and failed only when new, highly complex classes of securities, whose information costs were much
larger than those of the corporate bonds that had been the rating agencies’ steady diet, were introduced.
Another possible reason for using the current regulatory framework is lack of a good alternative. For
example, using market prices, such as credit default swaps (CDS) on bank debt, instead of ratings is
problematic as market prices used for regulation will, as Bond, Goldstein, and Prescott (2010) point
out, reflect the regulation itself. We study normative issues of ratings-based banking regulation in a
companion paper (see Harris, Opp, and Opp, 2012).
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of regulatory changes may be heterogeneous across asset classes.6 In the cross-section,
this may help explain why rating practices for some classes of securities are conservative
whereas ratings for other classes of securities are inflated.7 In particular, more complex,
harder-to-rate securities (such as CDOs) may have inflated ratings, whereas more tradi-
tional securities (such as corporate bonds), for which rating agencies have considerable
experience and hence a lower cost of information production, are accurately rated.
Our model features a monopolistic rating agency within a private-prospects setup in
which issuers/firms have private information about their type. There is a continuum of
firms with two types of projects: positive net present value (NPV) projects and negative
NPV projects. The rating agency has access to an information acquisition technology that
generates private, noisy, binary signals about the type of projects. The precision of the
signal is a continuous choice variable for the rating agency and determines the incurred
information acquisition cost. The rating agency may truthfully disclose its private signals
to the public, disclose biased ratings, or disclose no rating since the existence of the
signal cannot be verified, as in Sangiorgi and Spatt (2012). Information acquisition
and disclosure thus jointly determine the informativeness of ratings. We assume in the
main exposition that the rating agency can commit to an announced level of information
production and disclosure strategy. We show in Appendix A, however, that effective
commitment can be incentive compatible for the rating agency in a repeated-game version
of the model through rating multiple, not perfectly correlated, securities.
Absent regulation, the rating agency acquires costly information and publishes in-
formative ratings. Truthful disclosure is optimal as it maximizes the rents the rating
agency can extract for any given amount of private information it has. Although dis-
closing more favorable ratings relative to received signals increases the volume of highly
rated securities, the resulting dilution of the information contained in ratings lowers the
fee the rating agency can charge. This trade-off favors truthful disclosure. Thus, without
rating-based regulation, the issuer-pays arrangement is not subject to rating inflation,
that is, deliberate upward bias in reported ratings. With respect to the level of infor-
mation produced, given truthful disclosure, the trade-off is between the marginal cost of
more information production (which may vary across assets) and the increase in surplus
the rating agency can extract from firms by providing better information to investors.
Introducing rating-contingent regulation that favors highly rated securities may in-
crease or decrease the rating agency’s information production, depending on the distribu-
tion of firm types. Yet, relative to the equilibrium without regulation, the rating agency
has an incentive to rate more firms highly. If the distribution of firm types is skewed
toward good types, an increase in the preferential regulatory treatment of highly rated
securities leads the rating agency to produce more information, since increased preci-
6Our model does not suggest that rating standards should be homogeneous across rating classes.
However, the regulator should be aware of these heterogeneous practices as shown in the empirical study
of Cornaggia, Cornaggia, and Hund (2012).
7For example, exotic, structured securities receive a much higher percentage of Aaa ratings (e.g., 60%
for collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) than do corporate bonds (1%). See Fitch (2007).
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sion results in more highly rated securities. The opposite is true when more bad types
are present. Further, when the marginal investor’s economic benefit from the preferen-
tial regulatory treatment of highly rated securities exceeds an endogenously determined
threshold, regulation induces a complete breakdown of delegated information acquisition
that is characterized by regulatory arbitrage and rating inflation. We show that this
endogenous threshold is the level of the regulatory advantage at which pure regulatory
arbitrage delivers the rating agency the same profits as optimal costly information ac-
quisition and truthful disclosure of signals. The threshold thus depends crucially on
evaluation costs, making complex securities such as structured products natural candi-
dates for regulation-induced rating inflation. Moreover, our results predict that rating
inflation is more likely to occur in boom times, when a higher fraction of good firms
exists or the value of projects is higher, and in situations in which competitive forces
that determine the good issuers’ outside options are weak.8 The fact that information
is being chosen endogenously in our setup is crucial for rating inflation of this kind. If
information acquisition were costless, the rating agency would always acquire and publish
a perfect signal and rating inflation would not occur.
We structure the remainder of the paper as follows. We discuss the related literature
in the next section. Section 3 presents the model. Its empirical implications and evidence
are presented in Section 4. Section 5 concludes. Most formal proofs can be found in the
Appendix whereas additional robustness checks are relegated to the Online Appendix.
2. Related literature
Our paper provides a rational explanation of rating inflation driven by rating-contingent
regulation and an analysis of the effect such regulation has on the behavior of rating
agencies. In contrast, the models of Bolton, Freixas, and Shapiro (2012) and Skreta and
Veldkamp (2009) rely on behavioral biases of investors. In Bolton, Freixas, and Shapiro
(2012), rating inflation emerges from a sufficiently high fraction of na¨ıve investors, who
take ratings at face value.9 In Skreta and Veldkamp (2009), investors do not rationally
account for an upward bias in reported ratings that is due to the fact that issuers can
“shop for ratings”; i.e., they may approach several rating agencies and only disclose more
favorable ratings.10 The less correlated rating agencies’ signals, the more scope there is
8This result might explain the abrupt change in rating standards found by Griffin and Tang (2012)
in mid-2007 when the economic crisis was looming.
9Such a mechanism cannot explain, as we do, the striking cross-sectional differences in rating patterns
between conservatively rated plain vanilla corporate bonds and structured securities.
10Sangiorgi and Spatt (2012) study an environment in which ratings shopping of issuers is rationally
accounted for by investors. Consistent with rational investor behavior, Kronlund (2011) finds that
“investors appear to account for the expected bias in ratings when pricing yields. Specifically, if an
agency rated an issuer’s bonds one notch higher on average than the other agencies last year, a new
bond with a rating from this agency will be associated with approximately 12 basis points higher yield,
controlling for the bond’s rating.”
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for rating shopping.11 In contrast, our paper highlights the conflict of interest arising
from rating agencies’ ability to undermine the regulatory system, a channel which neither
requires rating shopping nor investor irrationality.
The models of Bolton, Freixas, and Shapiro (2012) and Skreta and Veldkamp (2009)
have the property that buyers are fooled by issuers in equilibrium. However, given the
scale of the 2008/2009 crisis and the involvement of very sophisticated institutions (see
White, 2010; Diamond and Rajan, 2009), an explanation that relies purely on behavioral
distortions might be too simplistic. Indeed, Stanton and Wallace (2010) conclude that
the sophistication of commercial MBS investors makes investor na¨ıvete´ a less tenable
explanation for the emergence of rating inflation in these years.12
Other models of rating agencies center around the idea that the interaction between
a rating agency and borrowing firms can feature multiple equilibria. In Manso (2011),
multiple equilibria with accurate ratings can arise if debt contracts specify higher coupon
payments for lower credit ratings, implying a feedback effect of ratings on default risk.
Boot, Milbourn, and Schmeits (2006) consider a model in which credit ratings can serve
as a coordinating mechanism among market participants that helps implement equilibria
without moral hazard on the side of the firm.
Whereas the focus of our paper is the issuer-pays model and its interaction with
rating-contingent regulation, one can interpret the monopolistic seller of information in
the classical models by Admati and Pfleiderer (1986, 1988) as a rating agency using the
investor-pays model. Among other things, our model deviates from their setup in that
the information provider can endogenously acquire information, but is not allowed to
trade on its own account.
Our theory is also related to the economics of broader information certifiers and
intermediaries. Lizzeri (1999) considers the optimal disclosure policy of a committed
information certifier who can perfectly observe the type of the seller at zero cost. Our
main departure from this seminal paper is that we consider not only the disclosure policy
of a certifier, but also study the ex ante incentive of the certifier to acquire costly in-
formation.13 Second, we introduce rating-contingent regulation that affects buyers’, that
is, investors’, valuations in order to study the feedback effect on information acquisition.
It is helpful to reconcile our prediction of full disclosure conditional on (endogenous)
information acquisition with Lizzeri’s result that the certifier discloses no information.
Lizzeri’s extreme result crucially relies on the assumption that the information intermedi-
ary is restricted to charge a uniform fee from all sellers regardless of their type, and, more
importantly, information does not matter from a social perspective. In our setting, some
11While Skreta and Veldkamp (2009) refer to low signal correlations across rating agencies as com-
plexity, we model complexity as the rating agency’s cost of determining the quality of an asset.
12Further empirical evidence on rating agencies’ practices, in particular rating inflation, in the struc-
tured finance market can be found in Benmelech and Dlugosz (2009) and Coval, Jurek, and Stafford
(2009).
13Endogenous information acquisition can also be found in the setting of Inderst and Ottaviani (2012),
who study the quality of customer-specific advice by an intermediary.
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projects have negative NPV, so information does matter from a social perspective.14
Various papers have analyzed the market structure for certification providers. Whereas
Strausz (2005), Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1984), and Diamond (1984) predict that cer-
tification providers are essentially natural monopolists, Lizzeri (1999) finds the opposite
effect. These opposite predictions result from the fact that market power in the first
three papers tends to reduce commitment problems from which Lizzeri (1999) abstracts.
3. The model
3.1. Economic environment
3.1.1. Agents, technology, and information
Our model features an asymmetric information environment in which firms have bet-
ter information than investors about the quality of their projects. Relative to a standard
private-prospects setup, we add a monopolistic rating agency that has access to a propri-
etary information production technology.15 All players (firms, investors, and one rating
agency) are risk-neutral. There is a continuum of firms of measure 1. Each firm is owned
by an entrepreneur who has no cash. The entrepreneur has access to a risky project that
requires an initial investment of 1 and may either succeed or fail. If the project succeeds,
the firm’s net cash flow at the end of the period is R > 1. In case of failure, the cash flow
is zero. Firms differ solely with regard to their probability of default.16 In particular,
there are two firm types n ∈ {g, b} with respective default probabilities dn, where g and
b stand for “good” and “bad,” respectively.17 Although only entrepreneurs observe their
projects’ types, the fraction of good types in the population, pig, is common knowledge.
The NPV of a type-n project is given by
Vn = R (1− dn)− 1. (1)
The good type has positive NPV projects (Vg > 0), whereas the bad type has negative
NPV projects (Vb < 0). The average project with default probability d¯ = pigdg + pibdb
is assumed to have negative NPV.18 The parameters of the model, such as the default
probabilities or the distribution of types, should be interpreted as asset-class specific.
14Similar to Rock (1986), Kartasheva and Yilmaz (2012) introduce differentially informed investors
into the setup of Lizzeri (1999). As a result, informative ratings can alleviate a lemons problem even if
all projects have positive NPV.
15Note that the oligopolistic market structure of rating agencies is much better approximated by a
monopoly than perfect competition. We account for some elements of competition by providing good
firms with an outside option.
16We assume firms default on their contracts with investors if and only if their projects fail. Conse-
quently, we refer to the probability of failure as the default probability.
17An earlier version of this paper contained three firm types. For ease of exposition, we now focus on a
two-type setup. Most of our results are robust to the inclusion of multiple types (see Online Appendix).
18This assumption simplifies some of the proofs, because one never needs to worry about the case in
which all firms get funded. This assumption does not affect our qualitative predictions.
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Firms seek financing from competitive investors via the public debt market.19 In-
vestors require a non-negative NPV on each investment. Since the average project yields
a negative NPV, adverse selection prevents financing of projects via the public debt
market unless information asymmetry can be resolved to a sufficient degree. Firms can
approach a rating agency that has access to an information production technology that
generates noisy, private signals s ∈ {A,B} of firm type, where A (B) refers to the good
(bad) signal. We consider the following signal structure (see the left panel of Fig. 1):
Pr (s = A|n = g) = Pr (s = B|n = b) = 1− α (ι) , (2)
where ι ∈ [0, 1
2
] denotes the rating agency’s choice of information production. Impor-
tantly, the quality of the rating agency’s signal, 1 − α (ι), is endogenous. Signals are
informative if the error probability α (ι) is smaller than 50%.20 It is convenient and
without loss of generality to assume α is affine; that is,
α (ι) =
1
2
− ι.21 (3)
Since signal quality is strictly increasing in the level of information production, ι, we will
sometimes refer to ι itself as signal quality. The cost function for information acquisition
C (ι) is increasing and convex,22
C ′ (0) = 0, and (4)
lim
ι→ 1
2
C ′ (ι) =∞. (5)
Consistent with practice, the publication of a rating involves two steps (see Fig. 1).
First, firms are provided with a free indicative rating r˜ by the rating agency (see also
Fulghieri, Strobl, and Xia, 2011). Second, the indicative rating becomes the public rating,
r = r˜, if the issuer decides to purchase the rating, denoted as pn (r˜) = 1, for a fee f > 0.
Otherwise, the issuer remains unrated (U) (see the right panel of Fig. 1).23 Since signals
s are not publicly observable, the rating agency can potentially offer indicative ratings,
19The exact nature of the security issued is not important for our purposes. Given our simple, two-
outcome projects with verifiable outcomes and zero payoff in the “failure” state, all securities are equiv-
alent. We refer to the security issued as debt in keeping with the fact that in reality, only debt-like
securities are rated.
20All results would go through if the error probabilities were different for different firm types. We
consider the effect of different error probabilities and more general signal structures in the Online Ap-
pendix.
21The affine functional form for α is not without loss of generality if the error probabilities are dif-
ferent for different type firms, but our results require only that the error probabilities are decreasing in
information acquisition and weakly convex. In the Online Appendix, we discuss further generalizations
of the signal structure.
22We assume the costs of information acquisition are sufficiently low that operating a rating agency
is profitable (see Online Appendix for a discussion of the parameter requirements).
23The equilibrium implications would be identical if the rating agency charged rating-contingent fees.
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Fig. 1. Conditional on each type n ∈ {g, b}, the credit rating agency observes a quality signal s ∈ {A,B}.
In case of a B-signal, the rating agency offers an indicative A-rating with probability ε. If a rating is
purchased by the issuer, pn (r˜) = 1, the rating r˜ becomes the public rating r. Otherwise, i.e., pn (r˜) = 0,
the firm remains unrated (U).
r˜ 6= s. We model this formally as the probability ε that the rating agency offers an
indicative rating of A to a firm with a B-signal. Thus, we consider only the economically
relevant case of an upward bias in the offered rating relative to the signal.24 As a result,
firms with an indicative A-rating are of above-average quality. Full disclosure (ε = 0)
maximizes the informativeness of ratings for any given level of information acquisition.
In the following analysis, we assume the value of future business is high enough that
the rating agency can effectively commit to any desired level of information acquisition
ι ≥ 0 and any disclosure rule ε ≥ 0. We provide a formal justification for this assumption
within a repeated-game setup in Appendix A. The formal argument resorts to variants of
the Folk-Theorem as discussed by Fudenberg and Maskin (1986) and Fudenberg, Levine,
and Maskin (1994).
We summarize the sequence of events in the game as follows:
1. The rating agency sets a fee f, information acquisition ι, and the disclosure rule ε.
2. Firms solicit a rating.25
3. The rating agency incurs information-acquisition cost C (ι) and receives a private,
noisy signal s.
4. The rating agency reports an indicative rating r˜ to firms.
5. Firms decide whether to agree to pay the fee f to publish their ratings, and ratings
of firms who do are published.
6. Investors decide whether to provide funding to firms.
7. Firms that agreed to pay the fee f do so, and invest the remainder of the funds
raised.
8. Cash flows are realized at the end of the period, and debt is repaid if possible.
24The Online Appendix proves that this is without loss of generality.
25It is possible to introduce an additional stage in which firms are allowed to send private messages
about their type to the rating agency, and the rating agency can offer a menu of contracts. Since the
equilibrium implications of this extension can be mapped into our current setting by (proportionally)
adjusting the cost function, all qualitative implications of our setup are unaffected. This extension is
laid out in the Online Appendix.
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To capture the notion that firms with good projects have access to alternative costly
ways of signaling their type, we introduce type-dependent outside options (see Laffont
and Tirole, 1990), U¯n, satisfying U¯b = 0 < U¯g < Vg. Instead of purchasing a rating from
the rating agency that we model, good types could choose to have their type verified by
another rating agency or some other financial institution with access to an information
production technology (e.g., a bank.). To keep the analysis simple, we assume firms have
access to their outside option regardless of the rating published by the rating agency. The
effective cost of these alternative technologies (Vn− U¯n) is assumed to represent a loss in
total surplus. Economically, the outside option captures in reduced form an important
element of competition and prevents the monopolistic rating agency from extracting the
entire surplus from the projects that are financed.26
3.1.2. Rating-contingent regulation
Regulatory and quasi-regulatory rules contingent on ratings can be found in bank
capital requirements, suitability requirements (investment class restrictions), or collat-
eral requirements. Although the underlying purpose of these regulations depends on the
specific context, they all share the feature that better-rated securities imply lower reg-
ulatory compliance costs. For the purpose of studying feedback on the rating agency’s
decision, it only matters whether these regulatory advantages have pricing implications.
The empirical analysis of Kisgen and Strahan (2010) reveals that investors require a
regulatory yield spread of 39 basis points (bps) for a one-notch rating change, holding
risk constant.27 We take this empirical result as given and incorporate the effect of
rating-contingent regulation in the following tractable way.
Assumption 1. The marginal investor assigns a shadow value of y < |Vb| dollars to the
differential regulatory implications of holding an A-rated bond instead of a B-rated bond.
Investors will purchase r-rated bonds with face value Nr if the value of expected
repayments and regulatory advantages (if any) weakly exceeds the funds provided to the
firm. Formally, the investors’ participation constraint for an r-rated bond is given by
Nr (1− dr) + y · 1r=A ≥ 1 + f, (6)
where 1r=A represents the indicator function for rating class A. The restriction on the
size of y < |Vb| is meant to exclude empirically less relevant cases and greatly simplifies
26With oligopolistic credit rating agencies, the value of the outside option is itself endogenous, i.e.,
from the viewpoint of each rating agency, the value of an issuer’s outside option would depend on the
strategy of the other rating agencies. Such an analysis is interesting in its own right, separate from our
focus on regulation, but would come at a great loss of tractability. Literally, our current model only
captures an exogenous, non-strategic component of competition. For example, a regulatory change such
as the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 exogenously increased the
competition from banks (see Ahmed, 2011).
27For this spread to be an equilibrium phenomenon, regulated investors must be marginal and regu-
latory constraints must bind (see He and Krishnamurthy, 2012).
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the exposition of the paper. In the Online Appendix, we demonstrate the robustness of
our results to relaxing this assumption.
Throughout the paper, we will consider y as an exogenous variable and will for sim-
plicity refer to it as the “regulatory advantage” of A-rated bonds. Since our analysis
focuses on the positive implications of existing regulatory rules, we make no attempt
to rationalize rating-contingent regulation within our model as an optimal regulatory
design.
3.2. Analysis
In the following, we analyze a symmetric Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the game
described in Section 3.1 (in which all firms of the same type play the same strategy).
Definition 1. Equilibrium:
1) Each firm makes a rating purchase decision, pn (r˜) ∈ {0, 1}, where p = 1 indicates the
firm purchases its rating, to maximize the net present value of its net cash flows (after
repayment of debt), given its indicative rating r˜, type n, the fee f , the signal precision ι,
the disclosure rule ε, and the financing terms for each rating class, NA and NB.
2) Investors set face values Nr to break-even for each rating class r, given the firms’
rating purchase decisions p, the regulatory advantage y, the information acquisition level
ι, the disclosure rule ε, and the fee f .
3) The rating agency sets a fee f , information acquisition ι, and a disclosure rule ε, that
maximizes its profits given the firms’ rating purchase decisions and the financing terms
required by investors.
For ease of exposition, we analyze the optimal strategies in three steps. First, we
solve the firm’s problem; second, we solve the investors’ problem; and finally, we use the
results from the first two steps to simplify and solve the rating agency’s problem. This
solution approach is similar to the approach used in Grossman and Hart (1983).
3.2.1. Firm problem
First, consider the decision of a firm of type n to purchase an indicative rating r˜,
taking the strategies of all investors, the rating agency, and all other firms as given. Let
Nr denote the minimum face value investors are willing to accept to purchase a bond
with (public) rating r. A bad type purchases a rating r˜ (p∗b (r˜) = 1) as long as Nr < R,
which yields a positive expected payoff. In contrast, a good type only purchases a rating
r˜ if the expected payoff of approaching the capital market using this rating is greater
than its outside option U¯g. Thus, for a good type to purchase a rating, the face value
of public debt must be sufficiently low, that is, Nr ≤ N¯ < R, where N¯ ensures that a
good firm is just indifferent between purchasing a rating and using the outside option.
In other words, N¯ satisfies
(1− dg)
(
R− N¯) = U¯g. (7)
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Since, whenever a good type purchases a rating r˜, Nr ≤ N¯ < R, the bad type will
also purchase that rating. This result is stated formally in the following lemma.
Lemma 1. pg (r˜) = 1 implies pb (r˜) = 1.
3.2.2. Investor problem
Now consider investors’ strategies, taking firms’ and the rating agency’s strategies as
given. Given Lemma 1 and the investors’ break-even constraint, we obtain
Lemma 2. B-rated and unrated firms cannot obtain public financing. A-rated firms may
obtain public financing if pg (A) = 1.
Proof. See Appendix B.
While the proof of this lemma needs to address all possible combinations of purchase
decisions of both types conditional on the indicative rating, the main idea behind the
proof is simple. First, since the average project in the economy cannot obtain public
financing, a security class r ∈ {A,B, U}, where U stands for “unrated,” must feature
a disproportionately high fraction of good types to attract financing. Second, since
firms with an indicative A-rating are on average better firms, only this class may obtain
financing provided that good types actually purchase the A-rating.
As a result of Lemma 2, the rating agency can only collect fees f and make positive
profits if it induces the good type to purchase the A-rating. By Lemma 1, this implies
that bad types purchase the A-rating as well, i.e., pb (A) = 1. Going forward, we will
analyze only the case in which pn (A) = 1 and pn (B) = 0 for all types n.
The masses of firms for which the rating agency obtains the signals s = A and s = B,
denoted as µA and µB, respectively, satisfy
µA (ι) = pig (1− α (ι)) + pibα (ι) , (8)
µB (ι) = pigα (ι) + pib (1− α (ι)) . (9)
Given a disclosure rule ε, the mass of firms with an indicative rating of r˜ = A, denoted
by µ˜A, satisfies
µ˜A (ι, ε) = µA + µBε. (10)
Since both types purchase the A-rating, the mass of firms with a public A-rating is also
given by µ˜A. The posterior default probability of a security with a public A-rating,
dA (ι, ε), follows directly from Bayes’ Law, i.e.,
dA (ι, ε) =
pig [1− α (ι) (1− ε)]
µ˜A
dg +
pib [α (ι) + (1− α (ι)) ε]
µ˜A
db. (11)
Competition among investors implies that the participation constraint (see Eq. (6))
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binds, i.e., the face value NA satisfies
NA (ι, ε, f, y) =
1 + f − y
1− dA (ι, ε) . (12)
Investors provide financing as long as NA ≤ R, the maximum firms can pledge to deliver
in the good state of the world.
3.2.3. Rating agency problem
The previous two subproblems imply the rating agency must set the fee f , information
acquisition ι, and disclosure rule ε such that it induces good types to purchase an A-rating(
NA (ι, ε, f, y) ≤ N¯
)
. In equilibrium, fees f are collected from all firms that are offered
an indicative rating of A, with mass µ˜A (ι, ε) (by Lemmas 1 and 2). Thus, the solution
to the following profit maximization problem determines the rating agency’s equilibrium
behavior:
max
ι,ε,f
Π (ι, ε, f, y) = µ˜A (ι, ε) f − C (ι) , s.t. (13)
NA (ι, ε, f, y) ≤ N¯ .
First, we solve for the optimal fee f as a function of information acquisition ι, the
disclosure rule ε, and the regulatory advantage y before studying the central question in
this paper on how information acquisition and disclosure rules are set. The investors’
participation constraint NA ≤ N¯ can be rewritten as a constraint on the fee using Eq.
(12):
f ≤ f ∗ (ι, ε, y) = (1− dA (ι, ε)) N¯ + y − 1. (14)
Profit maximization of the rating agency implies this constraint always binds: for a
given level of y and rating quality implied by (ι, ε), the rating agency wants to charge the
maximum possible fee f ∗. It is useful to define an auxiliary variable xn (y) that measures
the revenue contribution a firm of type n creates if it obtains an A-rating:
xn (y) ≡ (1− dn) N¯ + y − 1. (15)
This revenue contribution is increasing in the preferential regulatory treatment of A-rated
securities y, and decreasing in the outside option of good types U¯g. If y = U¯g = 0, the
revenue contribution of a type-n project is just equal to its NPV, i.e., xn = Vn, since in
this case, N¯ = R. Also, by Assumption 1, the revenue contribution of a bad firm with
an A-rating is negative for any possible y, i.e., xb (y) < 0.
3.2.4. Equilibrium
Benchmark (y = 0). To understand clearly the mechanics of our results, it is useful first
to study the optimal choice of information production ι∗ and disclosure ε∗ in an economy
without rating-contingent regulation, y = 0, before tackling the case of y > 0.
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Proposition 1. The benchmark equilibrium is characterized by
a) full disclosure (ε∗ = 0),
b) the level of information acquisition satisfies C ′ (ι∗) = pigxg (0)− pibxb (0),
c) the fee satisfies f ∗ (ι∗, 0, 0) = N¯ (1− dA (ι∗, 0))− 1,
d) the fraction of firms financed through the bond market is µA (ι
∗), and
e) rating agency profits are given by (1− α (ι∗))pigxg (0) + α (ι∗) pibxb (0)− C (ι∗).
Proof. See Appendix B and Online Appendix.
The rating agency fully discloses acquired information. Labeling firms with a B-
signal as A (ε > 0) reduces profits through two channels. First, it reduces total surplus
in the economy because a higher fraction of negative NPV projects is financed (recall
Vb (0) < 0). Second, it increases rents that accrue to bad firms (which are more likely
to get rated A) while rents to good firms are unchanged. Therefore, the share of the pie
accruing to the rating agency decreases. Thus, the reduced fee that the rating agency
can charge for its service outweighs the volume effect (more firms are rated A).
The optimal level of information production for the rating agency trades off the
marginal cost, C ′ (ι∗) , with the marginal private benefit of information acquisition that
results from increasing the proportion of good projects rated A by pig and decreasing
the proportion of bad projects rated A by pib. Each additional good project undertaken
generates a revenue contribution of xg (0) to the rating agency whereas each bad project
not financed avoids a loss of |xb (0)|.28
Rating-contingent regulation (y > 0). Now suppose the regulatory advantage of an A-
rating is positive. First, note that the rating agency would still prefer not to assign bad
firms an A-rating if these could be costlessly identified, because their revenue contribution
xb (y) is still negative, since y < |Vb| < |xb (0)|.
We now present the main result of this subsection and one of the main results of the
paper.
Proposition 2. There exists a unique threshold level of the regulatory advantage, y¯ ∈
(0, |xb (0)|) , such that full disclosure of information ι∗ (y) is optimal if y ≤ y¯. Otherwise,
all firms are rated A (ε = 1) and no information (ι = 0) is produced. The threshold level
of the regulatory advantage is defined implicitly by the equation
(1− α (ι∗ (y¯)))pigxg (y¯) + α (ι∗ (y¯))pibxb (y¯)− C (ι∗ (y¯)) = pigxg (y¯) + pibxb (y¯) , (16)
where ι∗ (y) is the optimal level of information acquisition for y ≤ y¯ defined by C ′ (ι∗) =
pigxg (y)− pibxb (y).
Proof. See Appendix B.
28We show in the Online Appendix that the choice of signal quality does not equalize marginal cost
with marginal social benefit.
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Fig. 2. The graph plots profits under full disclosure ΠFD (y) and rating inflation ΠRI (y) as a function
of the regulatory advantage y. Equilibrium profits Π∗ (y) for y < 0.24 are given by full disclosure. At the
rating inflation threshold y¯ = 0.24, profits from full disclosure and rating inflation are equalized. Rating
inflation obtains for y > 0.24. The dotted line plots full disclosure profits assuming that information
acquisition is fixed at ι∗ (0). The cost function satisfies C (ι) = 35 ι
2. The remaining parameters are
R = 2, dg = 0.4, db = 0.9, U¯g = 0, and pig = 0.75.
Proposition 2 shows that, although full disclosure will still be optimal if the regulatory
advantage is not too large, for sufficiently large advantages (y > y¯), the rating agency
stops acquiring any information (ι = 0) and rates all firms as A, including firms with a
bad signal (ε = 1). At the threshold level y¯, the level of information acquisition drops
discontinuously to zero. The existence of some threshold level follows intuitively from
the fact that higher regulatory advantages provide increased incentives to rate more
securities highly. The surprising feature, however, is that, at the threshold level y¯, the
rating agency still loses money on every bad type that is rated A, since xb (y¯) < 0. The
key ingredient for this feature is costly information acquisition.
The main ideas of the proof can be understood as follows. First, due to linearity of
the profit function in ε, an interior solution for the disclosure rule (0 < ε < 1) is strictly
dominated by either full disclosure (ε = 0) or complete rating inflation (ε = 1). Thus, the
rating agency’s optimal joint choice of information acquisition and disclosure simplifies to
the comparison of profits under two scenarios (as plotted in Fig. 2): optimal information
acquisition ι∗ (y) subject to full disclosure yielding profits of ΠFD (y), or optimal rating
inflation (ε = 1) with no information acquisition yielding profits of ΠRI (y) = pigxg (0) +
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pibxb (0) + y.
29 For low y, the strategy of rating inflation is unprofitable, i.e., ΠRI (y) <
0 < ΠFD (y), so that full disclosure is optimal. At the threshold level y¯, full disclosure
profits ΠFD (y) (left-hand side of Eq. (16)) are equal to rating inflation profits (right-
hand side of Eq. (16)). The existence of a unique threshold level follows simply from the
fact that profits under rating inflation are more sensitive to y than under full disclosure,
formally, Π′RI (y) = 1 > Π
′
FD (y) (see slopes in Fig. 2). The strict inequality follows from
the fact that more (all) firms capture the regulatory advantage under rating inflation.
Finally, the threshold level is such that the rating agency still loses money on each
financed bad type. This is optimal because full disclosure profits (see left-hand side of
Eq. (16)) require costly information acquisition, whereas rating inflation avoids this cost
altogether (see right-hand side of Eq. (16)). If information acquisition were costless,
the optimal threshold would be simply y¯ = |xb (0)|, i.e., the level at which the revenue
contribution of bad types becomes non-negative.
Note that the rating inflation threshold, which satisfies y¯ < |xb (0)| = |Vb| + 1−db1−dg U¯g,
may be so large that it is outside of the assumed parameter region, i.e., y¯ > |Vb|.30 In
this case, full disclosure will obtain for all y < |Vb|. We delegate the detailed equilibrium
analysis for the case y > |Vb| to the Online Appendix. Such extreme regulatory advan-
tages, that is, y > |Vb|, can give rise to another kind of rating inflation in which all firms
that obtain funding through the public market are bad firms and all good firms use their
outside option.
3.3. Comparative statics
A key objective of our model is to explain which economic forces determine potential
differences in the level of y¯ across asset classes, and how regulation affects rating stan-
dards when the regulatory advantage of highly rated securities is below the threshold y¯.
In addition to the effect of y, we consider comparative statics with respect to
1. the parameters c and k for the class of cost functions Cc,k (ι) = cC (ι) + k, where
c, k ∈ R+,31
2. the outside option of good issuers U¯g,
3. the payoff for success R, and
4. the fraction of good types pig.
We present some intuition for our results following the formal statements and discuss
their empirical implications in Section 4.
Determinants of the rating inflation threshold y¯.
29If the rating agency chooses ε = 1, any resources spent on information acquisition would be wasted.
30This can never happen if U¯g = 0.
31The fixed (set-up) cost, k, is only incurred if the information-acquisition level is positive.
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Corollary 1. The threshold level y¯ is
1) decreasing in the cost parameters c and k,
2) increasing in the outside option, U¯g ,
3) decreasing in the payoff for success, R,
4) decreasing in the fraction of good types, pig .
Proof. The comparative statics follow directly from the definition of the threshold (see
Proposition 2) and the implicit function theorem.
1) If the cost of information acquisition is higher (higher c or k), the rating inflation
regime becomes relatively more attractive. Fig. 3 illustrates this relationship by plotting
the equilibrium level of information acquisition ι∗ (y) as a function of the regulatory
advantage of A-rated securities y for low and high information acquisition costs (c = 0.4
and c = 0.6).32 The left (right) panel plots the comparative statics for the case in which
the population proportion of good types is greater (smaller) than 0.5. In both panels, the
rating inflation threshold is lower (0.11 vs. 0.2 and 0.07 vs. 0.1) when the information
acquisition cost is higher.
2) Although a better outside option for good types, U¯g, reduces the rating agency’s
profits in both regimes (under rating inflation and in case of information production),
it reduces profits from rating inflation more, because in the rating-inflation regime, the
rating agency provides all firms with the rents associated with the outside option U¯g (all
firms are rated A and obtain funding with face value N¯), whereas the agency provides
only a fraction of firms (those with high signals) with those rents when firms are rated
truthfully. An increase in issuers’ outside options therefore makes full disclosure relatively
more attractive, implying the inflation threshold y¯ is higher.
3) An increase in the payoff for success, R, has just the opposite effect on the in-
flation threshold as does the good firms’ outside option, U¯g. In particular, an increase
in R increases rating agency profits in both regimes, but it increases profits from rating
inflation more for the same reason that an increase in U¯g reduces them more. That is, the
increase in R increases the amount the rating agency can extract from A-rated firms, and
there are more of these when all firms are rated A. An increase in the payoff for success
therefore makes full disclosure relatively less attractive, implying the inflation threshold
y¯ is lower.
4) An increase in the population proportion of good types pig increases the rating
agency’s profits in both regimes, but it increases profits from rating inflation more. In
the case of rating inflation, all bad projects are rated A and contribute negatively toward
the rating agency’s profits. In contrast, only a fraction of bad projects is financed if
the rating agency provides informative ratings. A replacement of bad projects by good
projects (as induced by an increase in pig) therefore increases profits in the rating-inflation
regime more.
32In Fig. 3, C ′ (ι) = cι, where c is either 0.4 or 0.6.
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Determinants of information provision in the full-disclosure region. In the following, we
analyze the determinants of information provision ι in the full-disclosure region (y ≤ y¯).
First, consider the effect of the regulatory advantage y on the amount of information
acquisition ι∗ and the mass of A-rated firms µA.33
Proposition 3. In the full-disclosure region (y ≤ y¯) , an increase in y increases infor-
mation acquisition if and only if pig >
1
2
. Otherwise, information acquisition decreases.
The mass of A-rated firms strictly increases with increases in y for pig 6= 12 .
Proof. See Appendix B.
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Fig. 3. The graph plots equilibrium information acquisition ι∗ as a function of the regulatory advantage
y. The left (right) panel plots the comparative statics if the population proportion of good types is greater
(smaller) than 12 for low and high marginal costs c, respectively, where C
′ (ι) = cι. In the left panel, the
inflation threshold y¯ falls from 0.2 to 0.11 when c increases from 1 to 2. Similarly, in the right panel, y¯
falls from 0.1 to 0.07 when c increases from 1 to 2. The parameters for the left panel are R = 2, dg = 0.4,
db = 0.8, U¯g = 0, and pig = 0.7. The parameters for the right panel are R = 2, dg = 0.1, db = 0.6 ,
U¯g = 0.05, and pig = 0.2.
Proposition 3 shows that the level of information acquisition may increase or decrease
in response to changes in the regulatory treatment of A-rated securities, depending on
the distribution of risks in the cross-section.
In the left panel of Fig. 3, information acquisition increases as a function of y, since
the fraction of good types satisfies pig = 0.7 >
1
2
. In contrast, the right panel plots a case
in which pig = 0.2 <
1
2
so that information acquisition decreases. The “volume channel” of
regulation, the incentive to label more firms as A in response to a preferential regulatory
treatment of A-rated securities, drives these comparative statics of informativeness. Since
in the full-disclosure region, the fraction of A-rated firms is increasing in ι if and only if
33Note that full-disclosure profits ΠFD (y) is a convex function of y. Convexity results from the
endogenous adjustment of information acquisition. If information acquisition were fixed at ι∗ (0), the
graph would be linear with slope (1− α (ι∗ (0)))pig + α (ι∗ (0))pib as shown by the dotted line in Fig. 2.
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pig >
1
2
, the sign of the “volume effect” on equilibrium information acquisition depends
solely on the proportions of the two types pin.
Corollary 2. In the full-disclosure region (y < y¯), information acquisition is
1) decreasing in the cost parameter c and independent of k,
2) increasing in U¯g for pig <
κ
1+κ
and decreasing otherwise, where κ ≡ 1−db
1−dg < 1 represents
the ratio of success probabilities for the two firm types,
3) decreasing in R for pig <
κ
1+κ
and increasing otherwise,
4) increasing in pig for xg (y) + xb (y) > 0 and decreasing otherwise.
Proof. See Appendix B.
1) The comparative statics with respect to the cost parameters are directly intuitive.
Higher marginal costs decrease the level of information. This is illustrated in both panels
of Fig. 3 upon comparing low (c = 1) and high marginal costs (c = 2). Fixed costs only
affect the threshold level for rating inflation. Hence, conditional on full disclosure, fixed
costs do not affect the level of information acquisition.
2) An increase in the good types’ outside option may increase or decrease information
acquisition. On the one hand, an improvement in good types’ outside option increases the
rating agency’s incentive to identify bad issuers since doing so allows the rating agency
to avoid granting bad issuers rents they obtain by pooling with good issuers (these rents
are directly related to the outside option U¯g). On the other hand, the rating agency has
lower incentives to identify good issuers since it can extract lower rents from good types
when their outside option is better. The latter effect dominates if the fraction of good
types in the pool is large.
3) The comparative statics with respect to the payoff for success, R, are just the
opposite of the comparative statics with respect to U¯g. Intuitively, it is irrelevant to the
rating agency whether its rents are increased through higher R or a lower outside option
U¯g.
4) An increase in the fraction of good types increases information acquisition if the
gain per identified good type, xg (y), outweighs the loss of enabling financing for a bad
type, xb (y). Thus, it depends on whether the incentives for information acquisition are
primarily derived from sorting out bad types or enabling financing for good types.
4. Empirical implications
In this section, we discuss how our theoretical analysis may explain or predict the
observed behavior of rating standards. Hence, we focus our discussion on predictions
that can be most easily taken to the data, i.e., the unambiguous comparative statics for
rating inflation (see Proposition 2 and Corollary 1) and the mass of highly rated securi-
ties (see Proposition 3). We begin by relating the model parameters to their empirical
counterparts, with an emphasis on sources of variation for the regulatory advantage, y,
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and the parameters affecting the threshold level y¯.34 This is followed by a discussion of
how this variation affects ratings. Finally, we offer predictions about how planned future
changes in regulation, such as the Dodd-Frank Act, will affect ratings going forward.
Thus, these changes should provide a laboratory for testing our theoretical analysis.
An initial challenge for mapping our model to the data is the assumption that all
issuers are observationally equivalent and only consist of one project. First, we should
note that the “project” should be interpreted as the marginal funded project, and not
the set of all projects undertaken by the firm.35 Secondly, we should interpret our signals
A vs. B relative to publicly available information, e.g., conditional on the size/leverage
of the firm and the security class. This is consistent with the behavior of actual rating
agencies which have generally provided relative assessments within particular categories,
rather than across categories. Thus, for example, for some firms, the distinction between
A and B refers to the difference between investment-grade and junk status, while, for
others, it represents the difference between Aa and A (Moody’s scale).36
This “conditional” interpretation also yields a first source of exogenous variation in y,
our most important parameter. Following the results by Kisgen and Strahan (2010) and
Ellul, Jotikasthira, and Lundblad (2011), the regulatory advantage is especially impor-
tant around the investment-grade / junk threshold and at the Aaa vs. Aa threshold.37
Thus, even within a security class and within the same time period, the regulatory ad-
vantage of the higher rating, y, should be greater at these benchmark thresholds. By
Propositions 2 and 3, this creates greater incentives to inflate around these thresholds,
i.e., a systematic tilt of the rating distribution toward the higher rating. In fact, this
might explain why Griffin and Tang (2012) find that the rating agency in their analysis
made positive rating adjustments to their internal model output at the Aaa threshold,
i.e., a deliberate upward bias in ratings.38 Our theoretical framework would also suggest
that such positive adjustments should be significantly less frequent around less prominent
rating thresholds, e.g., the Aa to A threshold.
Secondly, while the source of variation in y discussed in the previous paragraph results
from differential regulatory importance across rating grades, differential importance of
regulation to the marginal investor across security classes provides cross-sectional vari-
ation in y (controlling for the rating grade). To the extent that the marginal investor’s
regulatory constraint binds in one security class, but does not bind in another security
class, say because the marginal investor in the latter class is a retail investor, one would
34This discussion has significantly benefited from numerous insightful suggestions of Chester Spatt.
35Thus, it is possible that even a highly rated firm funds (on the margin) negative NPV projects.
36It is important to note, however, that the actual ratings-based regulatory treatment of securities is
not conditional on such public information, i.e., regulation is just based on rating labels.
37Kisgen and Strahan (2010) estimate that the reduction in the debt cost of capital is 54 bps around
the investment-grade cutoff vs. an average reduction of 39 bps. Likewise, Chen, Lookman, Schu¨rhoff,
and Seppi (2012) find evidence that the priced impact of ratings is disproportionately large in BB+
bonds just below the investment-grade boundary.
38Note that the usually unobserved internal model output of the rating agency could be interpreted
as the true signal s in our paper.
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expect cross-sectional differences in the incentives to inflate. The competing behavioral
explanation for rating inflation of Bolton, Freixas, and Shapiro (2012) counterfactually
predicts the opposite result for rating inflation, i.e., particularly strong incentives to in-
flate in asset classes with predominantly na¨ıve retail investors. Along similar lines, one
could exploit cross-sectional variation in the “tightness” of regulatory constraints across
countries. To our knowledge, neither of these avenues has been explored. We also want
to note that our model’s predictions with regard to rating inflation do not apply to the
class of sovereign debt, since country ratings are generally free of charge. Hence, the
rating agency does not internalize the regulatory advantage of high ratings through fees,
which shuts off the mechanism at the heart of our paper.
Third, time-series changes in regulation provide quasi-natural experiments. Here, one
can distinguish between changes in regulation of the institutional investor, as exploited in
the commercial MBS sample of Stanton and Wallace (2010), or changes in the regulatory
status of a rating agency, such as in Kisgen and Strahan (2010). In the former case,
our analysis predicts the rating inflation in the commercial MBS market documented in
Stanton and Wallace (2010). In the latter case, Kisgen and Strahan (2010) investigate
empirically the results of the SEC’s accreditation of Dominion Bond Rating Services as
an NRSRO. This accreditation allowed Dominion’s ratings to be used for regulatory pur-
poses, implying that, after accreditation, a high rating by Dominion offered a regulatory
advantage, i.e., y > 0. Before they were designated an NRSRO, high Dominion ratings
carried no such advantage, i.e., y = 0. Consequently, our model predicts a shift in the
distribution of Dominion’s assigned ratings towards better ratings, especially around the
relevant cutoffs, after SEC accreditation. Kisgen and Strahan (2010), however, do not
find empirical evidence of this behavior for Dominion Bond Rating Services. It would be
interesting to examine the behavior of other recently accredited rating agencies before
and after regulatory approval.
After highlighting exogenous variation of regulatory advantage y (across the rating
spectrum, across security classes, and in the time-series), we now interpret variation
of other model parameters that affect the threshold level for rating inflation y¯ (as in
Corollary 1). For example, if we interpret differences in information cost functions as
reflecting differences in the complexity or difficulty of assessing the risks of the securities
in question, we obtain the implication that more complex security classes should be more
susceptible to rating inflation. It seems plausible that the century-long experience of
rating agencies in rating standard corporate bonds makes these assets easier to evaluate
than structured securities like CDOs, which require fundamentally different evaluation
skills.39 Viewed through the lens of our model, it is not surprising that CDOs were
subject to rating inflation, while corporate bonds were not.
As another example, suppose that the good issuers’ outside option, U¯g, reflects (in
reduced form) the extent to which there is competition from, say, banks or other rating
39Thus, although structured securities may not be inherently more complex than corporate bonds, the
existing human capital of rating agencies makes rating corporate bonds cheaper as most of the costs are
already sunk.
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agencies for facilitating the issuance of securities. Result (2) in Corollary 1 then implies
that, all else equal, increased competition for issuers can help prevent the occurrence
of rating inflation, but its predictions on rating informativeness in the full-disclosure
region depend on the fraction of good firms in the population, pig (see Corollary 2). The
empirical study of Becker and Milbourn (2011) finds strong support for less informative
ratings of Standard and Poor’s (S&P) and Moody’s as a response to competition from
Fitch. This result is consistent with our model if the fraction of good firms is not too
large for a sufficient fraction of the securities in the sample.
If we view variations in the payoff to success, R, or fraction of good projects, pig, as
reflecting primarily business-cycle fluctuations, then results (3) and (4) in Corollary 1
predict more inflation in booms, e.g., as in the period leading up to the recent crisis.
Consistent with this prediction, Griffin and Tang (2012) find a discontinuous increase
in rating standards in April 2007, when the recession was imminent. Moreover, to the
extent that the fraction of good types is smaller for new industries, result (4) may also
be interpreted as predicting greater rating inflation in new industries.
Our model also has implications for the planned overhaul of financial regulation. In
contrast to the supranational Basel III guidelines, the recently proposed Dodd-Frank
Act aims to eliminate all regulation based on ratings in the US. Since other countries
have not yet come forward with similar proposals to eliminate rating-contingent regula-
tion, an isolated move of the US could provide another interesting source of exogenous
cross-country variation. If this fundamental regulatory change is implemented, we would
expect a reduction of the regulatory advantage of higher ratings. As a result, our model
would predict a systematic downward shift in the distribution of ratings of the current
NRSROs, especially around the two identified thresholds. Ratings for security classes
that are subject to rating inflation, should become more conservative and exhibit large
increases in informativeness.40 For other security classes, the implied increase in con-
servative ratings should be less pronounced and informativeness of ratings may actually
decrease depending on the underlying conditional distribution of risks (see Proposition
3). For example, if one is willing to attribute the historically lower default probabilities of
municipal bonds relative to corporate bonds (conditional on a rating) to a significantly
higher fraction of good types among municipal bonds, then our model would predict
an increase in the precision of corporate bond ratings (where pig <
1
2
) relative to mu-
nicipal bond ratings (where pig >
1
2
) around the relevant cutoffs after implementation
of Dodd-Frank (see comparative statics of Proposition 3 with a decrease in y).41 To
make relevant net welfare comparisons, however, it is necessary to know how the alterna-
tive to rating-contingent regulation following Dodd-Frank’s mandate to use “all publicly
40This statement assumes that the decrease in y is sufficiently large to revert back to the full-disclosure
region.
41For S&P, the historical cumulative default probabilities for non-investment grade municipal bonds is
7.37% vs. 42.35% for corporate bonds. This significant differential is persistent across all rating grades
and is larger for lower ratings (similarly for Moody’s). These calculations have been compiled as part of
the Municipal Bond Fairness Act put forward by Frank (2008).
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available information” is implemented.42
Finally, we want to highlight that the robustness of the model to various types of
regulation implies that our model will not help us differentiate the effects of different
regulatory channels, say, suitability regulation for investment funds vs. bank capital
regulation. In terms of our model, we require only that regulation matters, i.e., ratings
themselves are priced in addition to the information they contain, to feed back into the
rating agency’s incentives to acquire and disclose information.
While different kinds of regulation may have different ramifications for other eco-
nomic outcomes, their impact on the informativeness of ratings, our focus, is effectively
the same. Similarly, governance rules imposed by private parties in the investment in-
dustry have become quasi-regulations with importance similar to official rules set by the
regulator. To the extent that Dodd-Frank does not affect this quasi-regulation, some ef-
fective regulatory power of rating agencies might persist even if official regulation removes
references to ratings.
5. Conclusion
This paper develops a theoretical framework to explain variation in credit-rating stan-
dards over time and across asset classes. Our model focuses on the interaction between
the issuer-pays model and the regulatory use of ratings, such as the use of credit ratings
to determine bank capital requirements. The analysis reveals how variables such as the
quality distribution of issuers, the complexity of assets, and issuers’ outside options affect
rating standards. Further, we show that the mere existence of a preferential regulatory
treatment of highly rated securities implies that small changes in those variables may in-
duce large shifts in rating standards. The effects of such changes may be heterogeneous
across asset classes and help explain empirically documented cross-sectional differences
in rating standards.
Although our implications are consistent with findings of the recent empirical liter-
ature (Stanton and Wallace, 2010; Ashcraft, Goldsmith-Pinkham, and Vickery, 2010),
a host of empirical designs remain that could be employed to test the empirical predic-
tions of our model (see Section 4). In particular, quasi-natural experiments that exploit
variation in regulation across jurisdictions or time are promising candidates given our
theory’s tight link to regulation. In addition, testing the feedback effect of regulation on
the behavior of rating agencies using official accreditations of rating agencies by regula-
tors, as considered by Kisgen and Strahan (2010), would be interesting. Whereas Kisgen
and Strahan (2010) mainly confirm the priced impact of ratings, future studies could test
the direct feedback effect of regulatory accreditation on rating standards.
Our current model captures competition in a reduced-form way through the outside
42The normative analysis of rating-contingent regulation of banks and its alternatives is the focus
of Harris, Opp, and Opp (2012). It should be noted that public ratings are by definition part of “all
publicly available information.”
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option of borrowers. It would certainly be interesting to develop a richer framework
that not only allows for competition from other rating agencies, but also from imperfect
substitutes such as banks or private equity funds which provide informed direct lending
to the borrower. To appropriately model the oligopolistic rating agency industry, it
seems reasonable to develop a dynamic collusion setup rather than applying an inherently
static view such as Bertrand competition. If rating agencies were colluding perfectly, the
oligopolistic equilibrium outcome would be identical to the monopolistic outcome studied
in this paper; an extreme, but not completely unrealistic case. Other interesting aspects
are whether and how rating agencies try to differentiate themselves in terms of price or
ratings quality.
Finally, from a theoretical perspective, it is interesting to address the normative side of
rating-contingent regulation, that is, to consider an optimal regulation design problem in
the presence of capital market frictions that motivate the regulator’s need for measures of
creditworthiness such as in the case of a moral hazard problem among banks. See Harris,
Opp, and Opp (2012). In this context, an analysis of the relative merits of using credit
ratings rather than alternative market-based measures of creditworthiness as a basis for
regulation would be a valuable contribution toward the financial reform debate. We leave
these important questions for future research.
Appendix A. Repeated-game analysis
Commitment plays an important role in our analysis. In a one-period setting without
commitment (and one rated firm), the rating agency always has an incentive to claim it
has received an A-signal; that is, the optimal ex post disclosure rule is given by ε = 1.
Rationally anticipating this behavior, investors would ignore any ratings for the purpose
of evaluating the risk of a security. By backward induction, any finite repetition of
the stage game will feature this uninformative equilibrium at each point in time. To
obtain informative ratings as an equilibrium outcome, one can either resort to introducing
incomplete information about the rating agency’s type (honest vs. opportunistic) in the
spirit of Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts, and Wilson (1982) or choose an infinite horizon setup.
Whereas Fulghieri, Strobl, and Xia (2011) and Mathis, McAndrews, and Rochet (2009)
choose the former approach, we will use the latter.
Let the previous setup correspond to the stage game Γ of an infinitely repeated game
Γ∞. Moreover, let δ represent the one-period discount factor for the rating agency and
assume for simplicity that all relevant actions occur at the beginning of the period.43 We
assume rating agencies announce not only the rating of securities but also the ex ante
probabilities of default associated with a given rating (as is their current practice). Let t
index time and ht−1 represent the entire history of both realized defaults in rating class
A and ex ante probabilities of default of A-rated firms. Note, that the announced ex
43This implies the realized cash flow from a project does not have to be discounted. This assumption
is not crucial but simplifies the comparison to the previous sections. See also Opp (2012) for a similar
modeling assumption.
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ante probability of default is fully determined by the disclosure rule ε and information
acquisition ι.
First, we consider the special case that defaults and signals are independent across
firms. With a continuum of firms, this implies the realized default rate of a cross-section
of firms perfectly reveals to investors ex post whether the rating agency deviated from
its announced information production and disclosure strategy. That is, the announced
default probability of dA (ι) must coincide with the realized average default rate d¯A if
the rating agency does not deviate. Formally, independence has the convenient feature
of allowing us to use the machinery of games with perfect public information. We aim
to support the best possible subgame perfect equilibrium from the perspective of the
rating agency using the worst possible equilibrium as the punishment for deviations from
equilibrium play.
Lemma 3. The worst possible subgame perfect equilibrium features zero information
acquisition ι = 0 and no capital provision by investors.
It is clearly optimal for the rating agency not to acquire any information, given that
investors will not fund rating class A. Likewise, given that the rating agency does not
exert effort, it is optimal for investors not to fund any rated firm. This is the worst
possible subgame perfect equilibrium for the rating agency.
Due to the equilibrium concept of subgame perfection, it is sufficient to check sus-
tainability by considering the best possible one-period deviation. The best possible one-
period deviation involves choosing ι = 0 and randomly assigning µA (ι
∗) firms with an
A-rating, where µA (ι
∗) refers to the mass of A-rated securities under the recommended
level of information acquisition with full disclosure. As a result, investors cannot already
back out a deviation from the supply of ratings alone. This deviation allows the rating
agency to collect revenue once from A-rated firms without incurring the cost of informa-
tion acquisition. The equilibrium considered in the previous section is sustainable if and
only if the continuation value from future business outweighs the short-run temptation
not to acquire information, that is, if and only if
S (ι∗)− C (ι∗)
1− δ > S (ι
∗) , (A.1)
where: S (ι∗) = (1− α (ι∗))pigxg (y) + α (ι∗) pibxb (y).
This results in the following:
Proposition 4. Folk Theorem: If the discount factor δ is greater than δ = C(ι
∗)
S(ι∗) , the
equilibrium of the repeated game Γ∞ replicates the equilibrium of the stage game Γ with
commitment on the part of the rating agency characterized in Proposition 1.
Intuitively, higher costs increase the temptation to cheat and as such increase the
discount factor threshold, whereas higher revenue reduces the threshold. Since the reg-
ulatory advantage of A-rated securities positively affects revenue, it makes informative
ratings viable for a wider range of discount factors.
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Note, that if y > y¯, the incentive problem of the rating agency vanishes. Investors
observe that all firms (mass 1) are rated A so that the disclosure rule and implied level
of information acquisition (ι = 0) is revealed through the report alone. In this case, the
discount factor is irrelevant and the repeated-game setup is superfluous.
Finally, consider the case in which investors can detect deviation from the equilib-
rium strategy only stochastically, either because there are only a finite number of firms
or because of correlation in defaults, even conditional on observable factors. In this case,
we can make use of the well-known Folk Theorem with imperfect public information (see
Fudenberg, Levine, and Maskin, 1994). Roughly speaking, if deviations from the rating
agency’s announced strategy can be identified with sufficient accuracy from public infor-
mation, then a discount factor δ < 1 exists such that for all δ > δ, the profit-maximizing
equilibrium with commitment described in Proposition 1 represents an equilibrium in
the infinitely repeated game without commitment.44 In this case, rating multiple firms
at the same time helps the statistical identification of cheating through cross-sectional
diversification and increases the range of discount factors for which commitment is fea-
sible.
Appendix B. Proofs
Proof of Lemma 2. Investors can potentially fund three types of securities: A-rated
bonds, B-rated bonds, and unrated bonds. Funding is possible if there exists a face value
Nr ≤ R such that
Nr (1− dr) + y · 1r=A ≥ 1 + f. (B.1)
Let p (r) = (pg (r) , pb (r)). Since pg (r) = 1 implies pb (r) = 1 by Lemma 1 and
p (r) = (0, 0) implies that rating class r is irrelevant, we have to consider only two
relevant subcases for each purchase decision. Consider first the decision to purchase a
B-rating.
1. p (B) = (1, 1): Recall that the set of firms with an indicative rating of B are by
definition worse than the average firm. Since, in this case, both type firms are
assumed to purchase a B-rating, dB (ι, ε) = d˜B (ι, ε) ≥ d¯. As the rating agency’s
fee is positive (f > 0), B-rated firms cannot obtain public financing in this case.
2. p (B) = (0, 1): In this case, investors infer that B-rated firms are bad, i.e., dB = db,
and hence, B-rated firms cannot obtain financing.
Consider now the decision to buy an A-rating.
44Since Fudenberg, Levine, and Maskin (1994) only prove the result for a finite action set, a direct
application of their theorem (without modification) requires the actions of the rating agency to be
discretized. The model of Mathis, McAndrews, and Rochet (2009) features incomplete information and
an infinite horizon. In their setup, the opportunistic rating agency also always reports truthfully if it is
sufficiently patient.
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1. p (A) = (1, 1): Again, since, in this case, both type firms are assumed to purchase
an A-rating, dA (ι, ε) = d˜A (ι, ε) ≤ d¯, i.e., A-rated firms are better than the average
firm. Since they also capture the regulatory advantage y, A-rated firms may obtain
financing provided that the level of information acquisition is sufficiently high, i.e.,
dA (ι, ε) is sufficiently low.
2. p (A) = (0, 1): In this case, investors infer that A-rated firms are bad. Since y < |Vb|
by assumption and f ≥ 0, financing for A-rated bad firms is prohibited. We will
consider the possibility of this case in the Online Appendix when we analyze the
parameter region y > |Vb|.
Since p (B) = (0, 0), unrated firms are either of average risk if p (A) = (0, 0) or worse
than average risk if p (A) = (1, 1). As a result, they cannot obtain financing.
Proof of Proposition 2. Profits of the rating agency are given by
Π (ι, ε) = S (ι, 0, y) + [pigxg (y)α (ι) + pibxb (y) (1− α (ι))] ε− C (ι) , (B.2)
where S (ι, 0, y) = (1− α (ι))pigxg (y) + α (ι) pibxb (y).
As the objective function is linear in ε, we need to consider only three cases:
Case 1. Full Disclosure: ε = 0. The choice of information acquisition ι∗ (y) maximizes
S (ι, 0, y)− C (ι).
Case 2. Rating Inflation: ε = 1. In this case, no information (ι = 0) is acquired because
there is no point in investing in information if it will not be used.
Case 3. Partial Rating Inflation: 0 < ε < 1. In this case, the coefficient on ε in the objective
function must be zero.
We will first show that Case 3 cannot occur in equilibrium because it yields lower
profits than full-disclosure profits (Case 1). Since partial inflation requires the coefficient
on ε to be zero, the associated information acquisition level ι∗∗ must satisfy pigxgα (ι∗∗)+
pibxb (1− α (ι∗∗)) = 0.45 This would imply that profits are given by
Π (ι∗∗, ε) = S (ι∗∗, 0, y) + [pigxgα (ι∗∗) + pibxb (1− α (ι∗∗))] ε− C (ι∗∗) , (B.3)
= S (ι∗∗, 0, y)− C (ι∗∗) < max
ι
S (ι, 0, y)− C (ι) . (B.4)
Thus, it is only necessary to compare the profits under full disclosure and rating inflation.
Under full disclosure, the optimal level of information acquisition ι∗ (y) must satisfy the
first-order condition, C ′ (ι∗ (y)) = pigxg (y) − pibxb (y). The rating agency’s expected
profits for Cases 1 and 2 are
Π (ι∗ (y) , 0) = [1− α (ι∗ (y))] pigxg (y) + α (ι∗ (y))pibxb (y)− C (ι∗ (y)) , and (B.5)
Π (0, 1) = pigxg (y) + pibxb (y) . (B.6)
45If no ι satisfies this condition, Case 3 is not possible.
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The difference in profits, ∆Π (y) = Π (ι∗ (y) , 0) − Π (0, 1), is a function of y, satisfying
∆Π (0) > 0 (since full-disclosure profits are positive and the average NPV is negative)
and ∆Π (|xb (0)|) < 0.46 Thus, the existence of a unique threshold level y¯ ∈ (0, |xb (0)|)
can be proved by establishing that ∆Π′ (y) < 0∀y ∈ (0, |xb (0)|). Using the envelope
theorem, the derivative is given by
∆Π′ (y) = −pigα (ι∗ (y))− [1− α (ι∗ (y))] pib < 0. (B.7)
The threshold level y¯ can be obtained by setting ∆Π (y¯) = 0.
Proof of Proposition 3. The first-order-optimality condition for information acquisi-
tion (see Proposition 1) can be written as
pigxg − pibxb + (pig − pib) y = C ′ (ι∗) . (B.8)
By the implicit function theorem, we obtain
dι∗
dy
=
pig − pib
C ′′ (ι∗)
. (B.9)
This expression is positive if and only if pig >
1
2
, negative if pig <
1
2
, and zero if pig =
1
2
.
The mass of highly rated firms is given by µA = pig (1− α (ι))+pibα (ι). The comparative
statics satisfy
dµA
dy
=
∂µA
∂ι
dι∗
dy
= (pig − pib) pig − pib
C ′′ (ι∗)
=
(pig − pib)2
C ′′ (ι∗)
≥ 0. (B.10)
This expression is strictly positive for pig 6= 12 .
Proof of Corollary 2. By Proposition 2, the level of information acquisition satisfies
for any y < y¯ :
C ′ (ι∗ (y)) = pigxg (y)− pibxb (y) . (B.11)
1) Obvious.
2) To obtain the comparative statics with respect to U¯g, note that
dxn
dU¯g
= −1−dn
1−dg . Thus,
by the implicit function theorem, we obtain
dι∗
dU¯g
=
pibκ− pig
C ′′ (ι∗)
, (B.12)
where κ ≡ 1−db
1−dg < 1. Thus, for
dι∗
dU¯g
> 0, it is required that pig ≤ κ1+κ (as C ′′ > 0).
46Recall that we constrain the subsidy y to be less than the negative contribution of the bad types to
the agency’s revenue, so that even with the subsidy, bad types’ contribution to revenue is negative. If
y = |xb (0)|, bad types contribute zero revenue in both the full-revelation case and the rating-inflation
case. In the full-revelation case, only good-type firms with good signals contribute xg (0) + y to revenue,
whereas in the rating-inflation case, all good-type firms contribute this amount. Thus, when y = |xb (0)|,
rating inflation is better for the rating agency; that is, ∆Π (|xb|) < 0.
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3) Applying the implicit function theorem yields
dι∗
dpig
=
xg (y) + xb (y)
C ′′ (ι∗)
. (B.13)
Since C ′′ > 0, sign
(
∂ι∗
∂pig
)
= sign (xg (y) + xb (y)).
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